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Germany and Greece agreed upon slowing down the family reunification procedures under the Dublin III
Regulation (Regulation (EU) Nr. 604/2013), with many doubts surrounding the exact terms and conditions of the
agreement. The German government did not confirm reports stating there was a monthly limit of 70 Dublin
transfers from Germany to Greece. But the numbers provided by the German government itself show a sharp
decline of the numbers of transfers. In a letter from the Greek Minister of Migration to his German counterpart
concerning the agreement he speaks of a ‘temporal limit of the number of persons to be transferred by month’.
The German government by its own account does not intend to reduce the number of family reunifications from
Greece, just the speed. Against this background, it is well worth looking at the legal boundaries of the German-
Greek agreement.
The Responsibility Criteria in EU Asylum Law
The so-called ‘Dublin transfers’ take place in cases where an EU Member State other than the state of residence
is responsible for an asylum seeker’s claim according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin III Regulation (Dublin
III). To understand the agreement`s regulatory core it is important to call to mind the important provisions that
allocate responsibility for asylum procedures within the European Union.
One of the most cited provisions is Art. 13 Dublin III which states that if an applicant has irregularly crossed the
border into a Member State having come from a third country, the Member State entered shall be responsible for
the asylum procedure. But, under Dublin III, family unity provisions are to be applied prior to Art. 13. In case an
asylum seeker lodges an application for international protection in Greece but has family members in Germany,
who are asylum applicants themselves or beneficiaries of international protection, the responsibility of the
asylum claim falls upon Germany (Art. 9 and 10 Dublin III). The family members considered for such purpose are
the spouses, as well as minor children and parents (cf. Art. 2 (g) Dublin III). In the case of unaccompanied
minors (Art. 8 Dublin III) as well as for the purpose of the humanitarian clauses contained in Art. 16 and 17 (2),
the presence of other relatives is also relevant.
Due to these family unity clauses, Germany is responsible for a high number of asylum seekers who find
themselves in Greece. The Greek Minister of Migration estimates their number to be more than 2000 people.
The Right to be Transferred in Time
Certain deadlines shall be respected in the Dublin procedure: according to Art. 21 (3) Dublin III, the request to
take charge needs to be submitted to the responsible state within the first three months from the date of the
lodging of the asylum application. The transfer itself has to take place within the first six months after the
acceptance of the request to take charge by the responsible Member State (Art. 29 (1) Dublin III). In case of a
delayed transfer the responsible Member State could reject the transfer, and the responsibility would fall back on
the country of residence of the applicant.
In the cases Karim and Ghezellbash regarding the general legal character of the responsibility criteria in Dublin
III, the European Court of Justice recognised an individual right to the correct application of the criteria. This
constitutes a change in the Court’s case law. Under Dublin II, the court took a different view in Abdullahi:
applicants could only question the application of the criteria by pleading systemic deficiencies in the asylum
system of the Member State they would be transferred to. Now it seems clear that applicants can appeal to any
wrong application of the criteria and to any delay of procedural steps (cf. the Opinion of Advocate General
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Sharpstone, para 58-115).
In the case of family unity it is even more obvious that any deadline is not only an organisational rule governing
the relation between Member States but a core interest of the affected persons. For sure, these constellations
are different from the ones covered by Art. 13 Dublin III. There, the question often is whether applicants can
proceed against a transfer back to the Member State first entered into (for example from Germany to Greece or
Italy). But since it got harder to move on irregularly from Southern European countries to reach family members
elsewhere, there are many cases in which applicants actually demand their transfer to other EU Member States.
However, the argumentation cannot be different in these “reverse” cases – the individual right to a correct
application just includes the transfer in time as part of applying the criteria correctly.
In summary, Art. 8-10 Dublin III grant an individual right to be transferred eleven months after lodging the claim
for international protection. This overall deadline results from time-limits the Regulation provides within the
Dublin procedure (Art. 21 (1), 22 (1), 29 (1) Dublin III). But since delayed transfers already occurred before the
introduction of monthly numerical limits, even more are to be expected now that another 2000 asylum applicants
are said to be waiting for their transfer in Greece and in case there is in fact a monthly time limit set to 70
persons per month. And every delay violates the applicants` rights under Dublin III.
It would, however, be possible to ensure that the transfers happen on time. According to Art. 7 (2) lit. a of the EC
Implementing Regulation 1560/2003, there is the possibility to hand out the so-called ‘laissez-passer’ to affected
applicants in order to enable them to independently travel to the responsible Member State such as Germany
within a period stipulated. This would be an easy option for Greece to speed up the family reunification
procedures.
Rejecting Delayed Transfers in Order to Keep People Away?
But how does the legal situation after the expiration of every possible deadline look like? Is it to be considered a
generous act of the German government to accept transfers even if the deadline already passed?
If one of the deadlines described above expires, the responsibility would fall back to Greece – at first glance.
There are, however, compelling reasons against such expiration under the family unity provisions of Art. 8-10
Dublin III. Recital 14 of the Regulation reads: “In accordance with the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
respect for family life should be a primary consideration of Member States when applying this Regulation”.
Disregarding the family unity provisions by allowing the responsibility of Germany to shift back to Greece is in
clear contrast to this recital.
The recital as well as the priority of the family unity provisions within Dublin III show that the regulation itself
places great value on family unity. The overall scheme of Dublin III and the principle of effet utile therefore
demand the realisation of family unity. And this is possible even after a deadline has expired: Germany could
make use of the humanitarian clause of Art. 17 (2) Dublin III. This clause shall be applied in cases where a literal
application of the regulation`s provisions would lead to a separation of family members.
The cited recital 14 refers to Art. 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which establishes –
inter alia – the right to respect for family life. Following the reasoning of the ECtHR, one could argue that Art. 8
ECHR does not generally guarantee a right to enter and reside within an EU Member State simply because of
family ties (see Nada, para 164; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer, para 39). However, the differentiated
jurisdiction regarding Art. 8 ECHR and family unity cannot easily be transferred to the Dublin system. The
situation under Dublin is different than for example a visa application from a third country. Under Dublin III,
Member States apply a clear system for allocation of responsibilities for asylum applications. If a Member State
allows that the deadline – in which family unity is supposed to be achieved – expires, it violates the existing right
to a correct application of the Dublin provision and thereby the right to family unity.
Sovereign interests of the Member States for such an intervention are not evident: by establishing an allocation
mechanism within the European Union the Member States delegated their competency for migration
2/4
management to the European level. In summary, the discretion in applying the humanitarian clause in expired
cases is limited to only one possible lawful decision (see here for more details – available only in German). As a
consequence, Germany is not allowed to refuse delayed transfers that are based on family unity provisions, but
has to realize the transfer under Art. 17 (2) Dublin III.
Legal Measures
The question is: what are adequate legal measures against the obvious risk of delayed transfers and families
being separated longer than legally permitted?
Firstly, the German-Greek agreement can be seen as an administrative arrangement falling within the scope of
Art. 36 (1) of Dublin III. This provision facilitates the simplification of the procedures and the shortening of time
limits; it does not, however, allow to bilaterally amend the deadlines of a procedural act, not even indirectly. If the
agreement leads to an even higher number of delayed transfers, the EU Commission should notify Germany and
Greece about the incompatibility of the agreement with the Dublin Regulation under Art. 36 (4) Dublin III. In reply
to questions from our organisation, the refugee law clinics abroad, the Commission, however, stated that it was
not even notified about the agreement as required by Art. 36 (5) Dublin III. The Commission deemed the
agreement not an administrative arrangement as defined by Art. 36 (1) Dublin III. But since this provision
includes all agreements regarding the practical details of the implementation of the regulation, this assessment is
not reasonable.
Secondly, the respective applicants could take their cases of delayed transfers to Greek and German
administrative courts. In such cases, the question of who is responsible for the delay arises. On a political level,
the letter of the Greek Minister of Migration seems to deny any political responsibility of Greece. On a legal level,
Art. 29 (1) Dublin III does not seem to provide an answer either: on the one hand, the transfer is to be carried out
in accordance with the national law of the requesting Member State (Greece), on the other hand a consultation
of the two states concerned is necessary beforehand. While submitting the request to take charge on time is
clearly a responsibility of Greece, processing the request without delay is a task of Germany. In contrast, the
transfer itself is rather a shared act. Still, Greece bears the responsibility for the most important action of
initiating and executing the transfer.
Germany – a Model for Solidarity?
Discussing the Greek-German agreement, it is important to point out a connection to the question of solidarity
within the Common European Asylum System. Based on Council Decisions (EU) 2015/1523 and 2015/1601
Germany has to relocate about 27.000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece. The German government in the
meantime “relocates” family reunification cases, as the EU Commission reported, to increase their relocation
numbers (see 11th report Relocation and Resettlement, p. 6). As these were all people for whom Germany would
have had to take responsibility under Dublin III, Germany played a trick on the statistic level.
Conclusions
It is prohibited under the family unity provisions of Dublin III to refuse a transfer only because of the delay of any
given procedural step. Furthermore, delaying any step of the transfer procedure itself also violates the Dublin
provisions. The EU Commission should not ignore its responsibility to examine the legality of the agreement and
take respective actions.
The Greek-German administrative agreement illustrates two recent trends: firstly, delaying family reunification
procedures through administrative or legal obstacles is not a novelty. Indeed, the agreement stands in line with
the long delays for appointments at embassies outside the EU or the suspension of family reunification for
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in Germany. Secondly, there is a highly concerning trend to adjust legal
provisions to political objectives. Political pressure is on Greek authorities to implement the political agenda of the
EU Commission and on Germany, especially regarding the so called EU-Turkey Deal. The asylum seekers in
Greece are already in danger because of the dire conditions in Greek refugee camps – the EU and Germany
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should care more about their situation.
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